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In an influential paper, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1994) utilize basic Public Choice 
to argue that market socialism would be susceptible to the inefficiencies of rent-seeking because 
politicians cannot be sufficiently incentivized to promote economically efficient resource allocation. 
Although the target of Shleifer's and Vishny's criticism is market socialism, their arguments apply 
equally well to democratic socialism. 
But Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 170) dismiss F. A. Hayek's (2007 [1944])'s The Road to 
Serfdom, because Hayek's work “made a relatively bigger impression on public opinion than on the 
economics profession” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 168). Nor do Shleifer and Vishny explain in any 
detail what Hayek's arguments were. According to their laconic summary, Hayek “argued that 
democracy is impossible in a country where a single leader has all the power that comes with 
controlling capital” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 170). While this is not inaccurate, it is extremely over-
simplified. Hayek's argument was much more detailed than this and it deserves further attention. 
Although Shleifer and Vishny (1994)'s general argument is persuasive, Hayek's own contribution is 
undeservedly neglected.
Even two authors highly sympathetic to Hayek, viz. Lawson and Clark (2010), concede that 
Hayek's theory was “[not] particularly detailed,” (Lawson and Clark 2010: 231), and even they can 
identify only three specific arguments which Hayek made: first, that power corrupts; second, that 
planners must subject voters to propaganda and political controls in order to dupe voters into 
supporting the code of values guiding and underlying the planners' plan; and third, that if voters' 
preferences are not stable, then for the plan to maintain stability and consistency, it must be 
administered non-democratically. Lawson and Clark note that these latter two explanations are 
inconsistent: according to one, voters are tricked into democratically supporting the plan, and according 
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to the other, the plan is insulated from democracy, kept out of the voters' hands so that their support is 
not even necessary. By one account, the voters are duped, and by another, they are bypassed.
But Hayek's arguments are far more sophisticated than this and less inconsistent with each other 
than Lawson and Clark (2010) suggest. According to Peter J. Boettke (1995), Hayek (2007 [1944]) 
demonstrated familiarity with several of the key claims of contemporary Public Choice. Some of 
Hayek's arguments were even advanced enough to resemble Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Boettke 
1995: 19f., Boettke and Leeson 2002). According to Hayek, no single consistent, coherent plan can be 
arrived at by democratic means. The needs to dupe voters and/or to keep the plan out of their hands are 
simply two corollaries of one Arrow paradox, equivalent to agenda-setting on the one hand and 
dictatorship on the other. Hayek's argument was more sophisticated than many have realized, and it 
deserves more attention.
Moreover, all of the aforementioned authors – Shleifer and Vishny, Lawson and Clark, and 
Boettke and Leeson – have completely neglect the parallel contribution of John Jewkes. Jewkes work is 
closely related to Hayek's even though Hayek's is far more well-known.1 In the Road to Serfdom, 
Hayek (2007 [1944]: 51) cites an early (1948) edition of Jewkes's The New Ordeal by Planning (1968 
[1948]), saying “[i]t is the best discussion known to me of a concrete instance of the phenomenon 
discussed in general terms in this book.”. Meanwhile, Jewkes described Hayek's Road to Serfdom 
(2007 [1944]) as “masterly” (Jewkes 1968 [1948]: xiii) for its “analysis which has never been 
confuted” (Jewkes 1968 [1948]: 182 note). Therefore, Jewkes's criticism of democratic socialism 
deserves notice, if for no other reason than the pursuit of intellectual history.2 
This essay will compare the arguments made by Shleifer-Vishny on the one hand and Hayek-
Jewkes on the other, demonstrating their mutual compatibility. Furthermore, it will expand on the 
Boettke-Leeson claim that Hayek presaged Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Finally, this essay will 
explore how the Hayek-Jewkes/Arrow-type argument affects the respective policies of democratic 
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socialism and deliberative democracy. We will demonstrate that the Arrow-type argument poses a grave 
dilemma for democratic socialism and for deliberative democracy. These two systems must be deemed 
“impossible” in the Misesian sense that they cannot satisfy the desires of its advocates.3 Because of 
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the political institution of democracy is fundamentally incompatible 
with both the economic system of socialism as well as the achievement of democratic consensus by 
deliberation4
The essay proceeds as follows: section I summarizes Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Section II, the 
heart of this paper, explores in detail the arguments of Hayek and Jewkes. This section elaborates on 
Boettke's and Leeson's claim that Hayek presaged Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, showing that Jewkes 
joined Hayek in this accomplishment. Furthermore, this section shows how Hayek's and Jewkes's 
arguments are fatal to democratic socialism and to deliberative democracy due to essential features of 
democratic political institutions.
I. ANDREI SHLEIFER'S AND ROBERT W. VISHNY'S “THE POLITICS OF MARKET 
SOCIALISM” (1994)
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 165f.), “Under all forms of market socialism ... 
politicians' objectives must determine resource allocation. Market socialists have traditionally assumed 
that politicians will assume an efficient resource allocation.” Advocates of democratic or market 
socialism “all presume efficiency-maximizing politicians” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 167) and when 
they prescribe what a good government ought to do, they “presume that it actually wants to do so” 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 167). Their criticism is essentially an application of the familiar and 
accepted conclusions of Public Choice (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 168) and it basically predicts a 
failure of political institutions to create appropriate incentives or to prevent the abuse of power. Shleifer 
and Vishny use the economic theory of rational, utility-maximizing individuals to cast doubt on the 
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general willingness of politicians – who are human – to implement market socialism the way it is 
supposed to be. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 166) claim that Oskar Lange (1938)'s proposal for market socialism 
successfully refuted Ludwig von Mises's argument that economic calculation is impossible under 
socialism. Therefore, they criticize only the political feasibility of market socialism, not its theoretical 
economic validity. They would appear to agree with Robert L. Heilbroner's (2008) statement about 
Soviet-style central planning, that “[t]he crucial missing element is not so much 'information,' as Mises 
and Hayek argued, as it is the motivation to act on information.”
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny have a second argument against market socialism: that it is 
vulnerable to rent-seeking, creating economic inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 171f.). They 
concede that the same problem exists under democratic capitalism, but they claim that the inefficiencies 
would be worse under market socialism (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 172-174).5 Hence, the criticism by 
Shleifer and Vishny of market socialism is a simple – though nonetheless valuable – application of 
straightforward, textbook Public Choice: the political officials will have insufficient incentive to 
implement market socialism according to the specified rules, and rent-seeking inefficiencies will 
undermine the rules of the system.6
It is worth highlighting that even though Shleifer and Vishny are targeting market socialism for 
their criticism, all of these problems they point out would be even worse under democratic socialism. 
For market socialism does attempt to impose highly limiting restraints on the behavior of public 
officials. According to market socialism, officials are to obey strict Neoclassical economic rules of cost 
accounting, and they are to have as little discretion as possible. There is no room in Lange (1938)'s 
system for any democratic input or discretion (Steele 1992: 157). The government's officials are to 
determine the solutions to simultaneous differential equations by a method of trial-and-error, adjusting 
parametrized prices until quantity supplied equals quantity demanded. Lange's goal is for the 
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government to discover the single optimal equilibrium set of prices and outputs. The government's 
officials could be chosen democratically if this is desired, but it makes no fundamental difference 
whether they are democratically chosen or not, because all the officials do is follow strict rules of 
accounting. While in fact, the implementation of market socialism would require public officials to 
exercise more discretion and entrepreneurial speculation than its advocates thought (Hayek 1948: 197-
199) – because, Hayek said, costs are not as objective as Lange thought, and so higher-level officials 
would have to constantly second-guess the subjective cost accounts of their inferiors – the fact remains 
that market socialism – in principle, at least – attempts to rigorously constrain public officials. Even so, 
Shleifer and Vishny demonstrate, it would be plagued by Public Choice problems. Meanwhile, 
democratic socialism does not even attempt to constrain the government by anything except the will of 
the people. But the people can will literally anything. There is no strict cost-accounting which the 
government must obey, nor are any other strict rules imposed so as to unconditionally constrain the 
government. Therefore, Public Choice problems would be even more pervasive under democratic 
socialism than under market socialism, and everything said by Shleifer and Vishny against market 
socialism applies doubly to democratic socialism.
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF HAYEK AND JEWKES
1. A Brief Summary
Like Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Hayek (2007 [1944]) and Jewkes (Jewkes 1968 [1948]) used 
economic analysis to criticize the political institutional logic of democratic socialism. Their argument is 
therefore a form of Public Choice (Boettke 1995 re: Hayek). But Hayek and Jewkes went beyond 
Shleifer's and Vishny's (correct) argument that political officials will misuse their power and be 
insufficiently incentivized, giving rise to economic inefficiency. According to Hayek and Jewkes, the 
problem is more profound: democracy is fundamentally incompatible with socialism on the most basic, 
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essential level. Hayek and Jewkes argue, not that politicians will abuse their power or that socialism 
will give rise to economic inefficiency, but that democracy and socialism are fundamentally 
incompatible, and therefore, that democratic socialism is incoherent. It is not that the government 
officials will have the wrong priorities or that they will use their power with malicious intent. Their 
argument is not primarily that power corrupts. In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny, Hayek and Jewkes 
argue that even a perfectly well-intentioned, benevolent, and altruistic government will nevertheless 
fail to accomplish the purposes of socialism because the political institutions of democracy are 
fundamentally incompatible with the economic goals of socialism. The political and economic systems 
simply do not match up in any coherent fashion.
Peter Boettke (1995) has already demonstrated several Public Choice features of Hayek's (2007 
[1944]) argument in the Road to Serfdom, so we shall briefly recapitulate his statements: several 
scholars argue that Hayek completely ignored Public Choice (Boettke 1995: 7). But Boettke (1995: 8) 
replies “the book set out to explicate how socialist ideas change the demands on democratic institutions 
and how these institutions are in turn transformed into instruments of totalitarian rule because of their 
inability to meet these changing demands in a manner consistent with democratic principles.” Hayek's 
contribution was the application of specifically Austrian economic theory to decision-making within 
non-market settings (Boettke 1995: 19). Such a project clearly falls within the scope of Public Choice.7
According to Boettke, Hayek first argued that the socialist rejection of competition would 
unintentionally empower interest groups and encourage special pleading for protection (Boettke 1995: 
10).8 Thus, Hayek understood one of the central claims of modern Public Choice, the logic of 
concentrated benefits and dispersed costs (Boettke 1995: 10). Furthermore, Hayek's defense of the rule 
of law – that laws should be abstract and generally applicable to all – may be understood as a call for a 
legal rule which eliminates opportunities for interest groups to obtain special exemptions and 
concessions by special pleading (Boettke 1995: 10). Note that in Boettke's reading, Hayek's argument 
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is very similar to Shleifer and Vishny's concerning rent-seeking.
Second, Bottke (1995: 11) says, Hayek argued that economic freedom and political freedom 
cannot be distinguished because there is no separate economic sector of life. Economics is the science 
concerning human action which chooses means in order to accomplish ends. Thus, economics concerns 
all areas of life, and economic liberties cannot be disentangled from any other aspect of life (cf. Hayek 
2007 [1944]: 124ff.; Mises 1981 [1922]: 73, 107, Friedman 1962; Lawson and Clark 2010).
Third (Boettke 1995: 11f.), Hayek examined the institutional incentives facing those holding 
political power under socialism. Just as market production is guided by comparative advantage, so is 
political production. Under both market and political systems, production proceeds according to 
opportunity cost. But a political system will tend to reward those who are less than morally scrupulous 
about the use and abuse of political power. Socialism fails, not because a few “bad men” accidentally 
find themselves in power. On the contrary, it is the institutional incentives of a socialist political regime 
answer which explain “why the worst get on top” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 157-170). The system of 
discretionary planning requires the use of authority, and this incentivizes those most willing to use 
authority with the fewest scruples. Notice here too that in Boettke's reading, Hayek's argument 
resembles that of Shleifer and Vishny and basic Public Choice.
Fourth, Hayek anticipated Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which “could be reinterpreted as an 
application of Mises's impossibility thesis to non-market decision making via democratic voting” 
(Boettke 1995: 19). Just as Mises argued that a socialist planner could not economically calculate, a 
democratic socialist polity – said Hayek – could not “calculate” the will of the people. As is well 
known, the only solution to Arrow-type voting paradoxes is dictatorship. This underlies Hayek's 
criticism elsewhere of the political provision of public goods: what are the demand-revealing processes 
when goods are politically provided? (Boettke 1995: 20). Hayek did not ideologically assume market 
failures away, but he recognized that like the market process, the political process is imperfect as well – 
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except that the political process does not engender the same incentives nor information as markets do to 
promote error detection and correction (Boettke 1995: 20). Unfortunately, at the time, “a naïve view of 
democratic governance dominated discourse “ and it was believed that “[t]he voting process 
unambiguously conveyed the necessary information” (Boettke 1995: 15). Therefore, critics could not 
understand Hayek's point (Boettke 1995: 13-18).
In summary, Boettke (1995) finds that Hayek anticipated at least three basic teachings of Public 
Choice: the logic of collective action which enables special interests to obtain privileges, the fact that 
political behavior is conditioned by the institutional constraints and incentives of the office, and 
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. The fourth feature which Boettke finds in Hayek, the impossibility of 
distinguishing between political and economic freedom, is crucial although it is not clear whether this 
should be considered an aspect of Public Choice or not.9 
It should be realized that what Hayek chiefly criticized was not redistribution of income by high 
levels of taxation, but command-and-control regulation and government ownership of the means of 
production. Hayek's Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) criticized the British Labour Party's policy of 
nationalization, and Hayek was inspired by the de facto nationalization-by-regulation accomplished by 
the National Socialist regime in Germany.10 Hayek was not primarily concerned with high levels of 
taxation and redistribution of income such as we might find in Sweden. As Bruce Caldwell notes 
(Hayek 2007 [1944]: 30f.), “[T]he existence of such states [i.e. welfare states], and whatever successes 
they may or may not have had, does not undermine Hayek’s logical argument from The Road to 
Serfdom: a welfare state is not socialism.”11 The Swedish system relied and still relies predominately on 
redistribution of income, with relatively little regulation or nationalization, and a high degree of 
protection of private property and freedom to internationally trade (Stein 1991, Sanandaji 2011, Tupy 
2016).12 Because taxation and subsidy do not entail the same degree of command-and-control as does 
regulation, therefore, the example of Sweden does not refute Hayek (pace Samuelson in Farrant and 
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McPhail 2009: 5, 9, 11, 12).13 Fittingly, Lawson and Clark (2010: 235) note that according to their 
empirical verification of Hayek's thesis,14
the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis [that economic liberty is a necessary precondition for 
political liberty] is confirmed most strongly when looking at the legal structure and 
property rights and the regulation areas of the EFW [Economic Freedom of the World] 
index. These two areas are more closely identified with political and civil liberties than 
the other areas of the EFW index (fiscal size of government, monetary policy, and trade 
policy).
Not all government interventions in the economy are equally likely to lead us along the road to 
serfdom. Hence, when I speak of “socialism,” I have a very specific meaning in mind: nationalization 
and central planning, or else command-and-control regulation so extensive that it begins to approach 
nationalization and central planning.15 This was the classical meaning of “socialism” as intended by 
socialists themselves. This is also what contemporary advocates of democratic socialism or economic 
democracy have in mind, although they are not always so explicit or lucid (Makovi 2016a). 
Fundamentally, what socialism so defined means is the abolition or severe restriction of the price 
system, where explicit government commands and regulations replace the information and incentive 
function of prices.
The remainder of this essay will expand specifically on those features of Hayek's thought which 
approached Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, showing that John Jewkes joined Hayek in these 
arguments as well. This essay will go beyond Boettke (1995) and Boettke and Leeson (2002) and 
demonstrate specific ways in which Arrow's Impossibility Theorem challenges the possibility of 
democratic socialism.
2. The Impossibility of Agreeing on a Plan
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In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek argued (2007 [1944]: 106f.),
Nor can a coherent plan be achieved by breaking it up into parts and voting on particular 
issues. A democratic assembly voting and amending a comprehensive economic plan 
clause by clause, as it deliberates on an ordinary bill, makes nonsense. An economic 
plan, to deserve the name, must have a unitary conception. Even if a parliament could, 
proceeding step by step, agree on some scheme, it would certainly in the end satisfy 
nobody. A complex whole in which all the parts must be most carefully adjusted to each 
other cannot be achieved through a compromise between conflicting views. . . . Even if, 
by this expedient, a democracy should succeed in planning every sector of economic 
activity, it would still have to face the problem of integrating these separate plans into a 
unitary whole. Many separate plans do not make a planned whole. 
In other words, democracy cannot produce the unitary economic planning which socialism demands. 
Democratic socialism would furnish only a disjointed hodge-podge of contradictory laws and 
regulations which have no unifying theme or purpose, defeating the purpose of socialism. David 
Schweickart, an advocate of economic democracy, admits the problem as well, saying (1992: 23),
Although the society is democratic, it would not be feasible to attempt a popular vote on 
each investment project. Not only does the sheer number of projects render such a 
procedure unworkable, but it would negate a major benefit of socialized investment: the 
conscious adoption of a reasonably coordinated, coherent set of investment priorities
Hayek and Schweickart seem to agree: a transitory elected government composed of disagreeing 
factions cannot produce a coherent, consistent plan. No consensus will be forthcoming where “there 
exists no agreed view on what ought to be done” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 101).
Democracy may be workable for the management and regulation of a free-market economy 
simply because the government's activities are so restricted. A “night-watchman” state has far less to do 
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than a socialist state. In other words, the smaller the scope of government, the simpler the task of 
achieving democratic consensus. But socialism dramatically expands the scope of government to 
embrace all aspects of life whatsoever. A consensus is more difficult to achieve the broader the scope of 
the state's activities. Nothing remotely resembling a consensus can be obtained when the government's 
scope is so expanded to embrace all aspects of life. Whereas markets promote and encourage diversity 
and pluralism, governance demands uniformity. The more government supplants markets, the more 
uniformity replaces diversity. Greater reliance on government means that people cannot be allowed to 
go their own way, but more and more people must somehow agree on more and more subjects. As 
Hayek said, “[T]he probability that they [those attempting to achieve a democratic consensus] will 
agree on a particular course of action necessarily decreases as the scope of such action extends” (Hayek 
2007 [1944]:103). “We may rely on voluntary agreement to guide the action of the state only so long as 
it is confined to spheres where agreement exists” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 103). But in pursuing a socialist 
policy, “democracy embarks upon a course of planning which in its execution requires more agreement 
than in fact exists” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 103).16 
The problem is that under socialism (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 104),
the agreement on the desirability of planning is not supported by agreement on the ends 
the plan is to serve. The effect of the people's agreeing that there must be central 
planning, without agreeing on the ends, will be rather as if a group of people were to 
commit themselves to take a journey together without agreeing where they want to go: 
with the result that they may all have to make a journey which most of them do not want 
at all. 
Indeed, John Jewkes showed that the central economic plans of Britain's Labour and Conservative 
parties were all mutually-contradictory (Jewkes 1968 [1948]: 80-96, 1978: 61-76). Everyone agreed 
they wanted planning but nobody agreed what the plan should be. Because no consensus can ever be 
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reached, democratic socialism must and did essentially devolve into interest-group-lobbying, where 
every faction strove to funnel pork to its own constituents. As John Jewkes noted, the minister of a 
regime of central economic planning “will be subject to powerful pressure groups” which will 
“inevitably make him the guardian of some vested interest” (Jewkes 1968 [1948]: 130). No coherent 
central plan can arise from this, according to Jewkes (1968 [1948]: 133; cf. ibid. 218):
an integrated scheme must inevitably be examined by those whose interests and 
knowledge are essentially local and piecemeal. The plan will be subjected to distortion 
through the activities of pressure groups.
And so the product of democratic socialism will be “one big compromise, just like a bill in the 
Assembly that no one wants to pass but no one is willing to kill. The thing gets modified and diddled in 
committee until it's equally unacceptable to everyone” (“Thresher” 174).17 Therefore, as Nicholas 
Capaldi and Gordon Lloyd have noted (2011: p. xxi, n. 4), “Marxists have always been rightly 
contemptuous of democratic socialism because shifting majorities literally makes even the façade of 
economic planning impossible.”
Interestingly, another democratic socialist, Michael Harrington seems to have caught a glimpse 
of this problem, saying (1978: 443),
[D]ebates over priorities . . . would be resolved by a democratic process in which parties 
would compete with one another over conflicting programs. That, however, would not 
mean a mere extension of present-day “pluralist” theory, which ignores the way formal 
democratic rights, precious as they are, can be subverted by economic and social 
inequalities.
But Harrington does not explain how democratic socialism would avoid the pitfalls of democratic 
pluralism. He even admits (1978: 446), “I am positing the necessity of conflict among organizations 
that would interpret the common good in terms of the particular good of different strata of the 
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citizenry.” After this admission, it is not clear what there is left of democratic socialism to salvage.
3. The Problem of Special Interest Lobbying (Rent-Seeking): Two Interpretations
In some respects, the foregoing analysis by Hayek and Jewkes is similar to that of Shleifer and 
Vishny, but there are important distinctions to be drawn. As we saw, Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 
171f.)argue that markt socialism will give rise to rent-seeking inefficiencies. Essentially, GDP will be 
less than it could have been and resources will be misallocated. And as we saw, Boettke (1995: 10) 
argues that Hayek also understood the logic of “concentrated benefits, dispersed costs.”  However, 
there is an important nuance in Hayek's and Jewkes's argument which Shleifer and Vishny miss, 
beyond the logic of interest group privileges and rent-seeking. Unlike Shleifer and Vishny, Hayek and 
Jewkes do not merely argue that interest group lobbying will lead to more economic inefficiency. 
Instead, Hayek's and Jewkes's argument is more fundamental: the outcome of interest group lobbying at 
all is fundamentally at odds with the very essence and intention of socialism. Central economic 
planning only makes sense if there is a unitary, consistent, coherent central plan. The very existence of 
conflicting interest groups which influence government, regardless of the magnitude of the inefficiency 
they engender, defeats the very purpose of socialism. 
One of the fundamental Marxist criticisms of the market had been that the market economy is 
an “anarchy of production” which must be replaced with conscious, rational direction. Socialists found 
it unconscionable that the market was being driven by price-signals which seemed to emerge from 
nowhere. Only a consciously-designed system, they thought, was deserving of rational human beings. 
As Mises said (1981 [1922]: 413),
To the socialist, the coming of Socialism means a transition from an irrational to a 
rational economy. Under Socialism, planned management of economic life takes the 
place of anarchy of production; society, which is conceived as the incarnation of reason, 
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takes the place of the conflicting aims of unreasonable and self-interested individuals.
Thus, many socialists were concerned not only with inequality and poverty but also with the fact that 
the apparent irrationality and inscrutability of the unplanned spontaneous order of the market economy. 
It was cosmically unfair that rational human beings had to obey mysterious price signals. Only 
socialism – the conscious, central direction of the economy – would allow man to finally live as man 
and not animal, guiding his own destiny, living rationally according to his own will. The anarchy of 
production was an existential injustice which made a mockery of humankind, as Engels made clear in 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Engels 1892 [1890]: ch. 3):
But when once [the] nature [economic and productive forces are] understood, they can, 
in the hands of the producers working together, be transformed from master demons into 
willing servants. . . . [We will]  subject them more and more to our own will, and by 
means of them to reach our own ends. . . . With the seizing of the means of production 
by society, production of commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the 
mastery of the product over the producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by 
systematic, definite organization. The struggle for individual existence disappears. Then, 
for the first time, man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the 
animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really 
human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which 
have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for 
the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now become 
master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action, hitherto 
standing face-to-face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him, will 
then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man's own social 
organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, 
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now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that 
have, hitherto, governed history,pass under the control of man himself. Only from that 
time will man himself, more and more consciously, make his own history — only from 
that time will the social causes set in movement by him have, in the main and in a 
constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the ascent of man from 
the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. 
For socialists, abolishing the anarchy of production took on cosmic importance. It was not merely 
about achieving social justice. It was about freeing mankind from an animal existence and finally 
letting it live as human beings. The abolition of capitalism meant mankind would be free to fulfill its 
destiny as rational beings (Lavoie 1985a: 46).  As David Ramsay Steele (1992: 39-43) notes, this 
abhorrence to the anarchy of production relates to the critique of commodity fetishism. “For Marx, 
commodity fetishism is something which always arises automatically from the fact that the market is 
unplanned” (Steele 1992: 40). Steele (1992: 41) argues that for Marx, this is more important than 
material inequality:
It is this absence of control by human beings of their individual and collective destinies 
which is the true source of the pathos of Capital. Readers impressed primarily by the 
documented physical deprivation and squalor have read it superficially. Capital is a saga 
of the mysterious, macabre adventures that befall people who have lost conscious 
control of their collective lives.
But, Steele (1992: 43), “Marx never considers that the fetishism of commodities maybe no odder than 
the fetishism of committees.” 
Therefore, Hayek's and Jewkes's criticism cuts closer to the heart of the matter than Shleifer's 
and Vishny's. Shleifer and Vishny predict that interest group lobbying will engender economic 
inefficiency, but conceivably, a socialist could be willing to tolerate greater economic inefficiency if 
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this maximized other, more important goals, such as income equality. In fact, properly understood, this 
would not entail economic inefficiency at all, because efficiency means the satisfaction of one's goals at 
least cost. If one's goal is income equality, then it may be efficient to sacrifice wealth maximization in 
favor of equality. If rent-seeking and the conferral of privileges for special interests somehow promoted 
equality, then this might actually be efficient. But according to Hayek and Jewkes, interest groups 
would not merely produce economic inefficiency but they would give rise to directionless and 
incoherent anarchy. Similarly, Lavoie (1985a: 161) says about the democratic socialists that, “To the 
extent that they insist on genuinely decentralized decision-making they are proposing the arbitrary and 
uncoordinated injection of contradictory policies by all levels and departments of government. In other 
words they have a prescription for chaos, not rational planning.” 
If Hayek and Jewkes are correct, it is not merely that socialism is inefficient, as Shleifer and 
Vishny claim. Instead, socialism utterly fails its aspiration to enable man to live according to reason. 
The existence of rent-seeking under socialism means that mankind will fail to elevate itself beyond the 
animal reliance on the forces of nature. If socialism means chaotic jockeying among interest groups 
with an irrational, indeterminate outcome, then man is still a slave to forces beyond his control. The 
inconvenience of economic inefficiency pales against the cosmic injustice of the anarchy of production 
which would remain unresolved under socialism.
Whereas Shleifer and Vishny rely on Mancur Olson (1965) and Gary Becker (1983) for their 
model of regulation,18 Hayek's and Jewkes's theory of incoherence and instability of decision-making 
under democratic socialism appears more in line with Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Boettke and 
Leeson 2002, Boettke 1995: 19). Arrow mathematically showed that it is impossible to aggregate a 
multitude of individually ordinal and transitive preference functions into one single ordinal-transitive 
social preference function. Any possible voting rule whatsoever will be susceptible to one of several 
paradoxes, and given individually transitive and ordinal preferences, there is no mathematically-
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guaranteed way to aggregate them together into one social preference function while avoiding 
paradoxes. The only means by which the political preference function can satisfy all of Arrow's 
conditions and avoid paradox is through dictatorship, because dictatorship avoids the need to aggregate 
individual preference functions into one social preference function in the first place (Butler 2012: 32; 
Stevens 1993: 47, 143-145; Hinich and Munger 1997: 95-99). The wider the scope of government, and 
the more authority democratic institutions are entrusted with, the more likely an Arrow paradox is to 
occur. The broader the scope of government, the more likely one will have to resort to dictatorship to 
guarantee rationality and avoidance of paradox.
The Arrow theorem poses a grave dilemma for democratic socialism. What socialism 
fundamentally aims to accomplish is the transformation of society from what Michael Oakeshott 
(1975) called a “civil association” of shared means – such as private property and the rule-of-law – 
intended to enable all its members to pursue their own happiness as they individually define it for 
themselves, into an “enterprise association” of a single set of shared ends common to all members of 
society. It is doubtful whether this goal is morally desirable or whether it is compatible with individual 
freedom, for the rule-of-law as Hayek understood it can exist only in what Oakeshott called a civic 
association (Capaldi and Lloyd 2011: xxiii). But even if – for the sake of argument – we assume that 
this transformation of society into an enterprise association is compatible with liberty and individual 
rights, the fact is that the Arrow paradox means that it is impossible for democratic institutions to 
successfully accomplish this transformation. Democratic institutions, subject to the Arrow paradox, are 
unable to translate diverse individual ends into a single set of shared ends. This is not so damaging for 
capitalistic or market-based institutions, because these have the more modest purpose of maintaining 
society as a mere civic association. Since the goal of such institutions is not to unite society behind one 
single set of ends, their effectiveness is not undermined as much by the Arrow paradox. But because 
democratic socialism intends to unite society behind some single set of shared ends and to transform 
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society into an enterprise association, the Arrow paradox is particularly fatal to democratic socialism. 
Only dictatorship is consistently capable of accomplishing socialism's call to transform society from a 
civic to an enterprise association.
Hayek and Jewkes do not merely say that pressure groups will create economic inefficiencies. 
Their criticism is more fundamental: the unitary, coherent, consistent plan demanded by socialism 
simply cannot be obtained under democracy. Democratic socialism cannot work because there is no 
way to deduce societal preferences or the one and only “general will.” Just as Mises showed that 
socialism cannot economically calculate the optimal production decisions, likewise, Hayek, Jewkes, 
and Arrow showed that neither can socialism “calculate” the will of the people or the optimal political 
policy without resorting to dictatorship. If we interpret Hayek's argument as a form of the Arrow 
theorem, then we can understand his claim that the chaos and incoherency of democratic economic 
planning will tend to conclude with the people demanding the appointment of a dictator who can 
bypass the legislature and finally “get things done.” Furthermore, either the dictator will dupe the 
people into supporting his plan or else he will use undemocratic means to bypass the people; these two 
methods correspond to agenda-setting and dictatorship, precisely what is predicted by the Arrow 
theorem.
The point here is not that democratic socialism must necessarily be dictatorial, but rather that it 
must be dictatorial in order to produce a unitary socialist economic plan. Contrariwise, democratic 
socialism may eschew dictatorship but in doing so, it creates the possibility that the central economic 
plan will be incoherent and random. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that one may eliminate 
paradoxes only at the cost of dictatorship and that one may avoid dictatorship only at the cost of 
suffering democratic paradoxes. This undermines the “naive view of democratic governance [which] 
dominated discourse” at the time of Hayek and Jewkes and refutes the notion that “[t]he voting process 
unambiguously conveyed the necessary information” (Boettke 1995: 15).
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The foregoing analysis poses a similar problem for the theory of deliberative democracy as 
well. Democratic socialism and deliberative democracy are by no means equivalent, but they share the 
need to achieve a consensus in order to transform society from a civic association into an enterprise 
association. Therefore, we should not be surprised that Hayek's analysis of how factionalism ruins 
democratic socialism, applies to deliberative democracy as well. Specifically, Hayek perceived that 
absolute democracy does not always or even necessarily usually result in the majority's oppressing the 
minority. Instead, it sometimes results in the very opposite, where minorities log-roll together to obtain 
special privileges for themselves. Hayek wrote (1984b [1976]: 125), “Omnipotent democracy indeed 
leads of necessity to a kind of socialism, but to a socialism which nobody foresaw or probably wanted . 
. . [operating on] the power of those persons or groups [in the minority] to extort special benefits from 
the government [of the majority].” Furthermore, Hayek said (1984a [1976]: 356f.),
In such a democratically elected assembly with unlimited power to confer special 
benefits and impose special burdens on particular groups, a majority can be formed only 
by buying the support of numerous special interests, through granting them such 
benefits at the expense of a minority. . . . It is the result of this bargaining process which 
is dignified as the 'will of the majority.' . . . [N]o genuine agreement among a majority 
exists, but for which the support of a majority has been obtained by deals. . . . In an 
omnipotent assembly which is concerned mainly with particulars and not with 
principles, majorities are therefore not based on agreement of opinions, but are formed 
by aggregations of special interests mutually assisting each other.
Hayek's argument thus poses a special challenge to the theory of deliberative democracy, according to 
which (Hague and Harrop 2007: 46f.)
we should view democracy as a method of communication. ... In an open debate 
arguments based on private interests are soon recognized and discounted; public reason 
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involves appeal to the public good. ... In such conditions, a consensus should emerge 
about what is truly in the public interest, with reason triumphing over interests. 
This theory presumes that majorities are “based on agreement of opinions . . . [whereas in fact, they] 
are formed by aggregations of special interests mutually assisting each other” (Hayek 1984a [1976]: 
357). Hague and Harrop (2007: 47) incisively point out that “few advocates of deliberative democracy 
offer specific guidance on institutional arrangements to secure their objective.” The Hayek-Jewkes 
argument – which resembles Arrow's theorem – is therefore applicable to both democratic socialism 
and to deliberative democracy because both rely on the achievement of consensus. 
Whereas Shleifer and Vishny (1994) claim that market socialism will merely give rise to rent-
seeking inefficiencies, Hayek and Jewkes argue that democratic socialism will produce sheer 
indeterminate chaos. An advocate of democratic socialism or deliberative democracy could reply to 
Shleifer and Vishny that they are willing to tolerate a reduction in productivity and GDP if it means 
greater equality or if this allows mankind to take its destiny into its own hands, or if this assists society 
in achieving consensus. But Hayek and Jewkes argued that rent-seeking under democratic socialism 
and deliberative democracy would not merely lead to inefficiency, but chaos and absurdity. It is not 
merely that GDP will fall. Instead, it is impossible to form either a consensus or a coherent, unitary 
economic plan under democracy. This fact is fatal to democratic socialism and deliberative democracy; 
democratic political institutions and socialist economics are fundamentally incompatible, and 
democracy does not make possible the desired transformation of society from a civic association of 
shared means to an enterprise association of shared ends.
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1 Wilhelm Röpke as well made arguments similar to those of Hayek and Jewkes: see Röpke (1987 
[1951]: 24-35, 1992 [1942]: 83-99, 1998 [1957]: 90-150). However, Röpke's arguments in this area 
were exceedingly brief, and anything he did say on our subject was said in much more detail by 
Hayek and Jewkes. Therefore, this essay will confine itself to reexamining Hayek and Jewkes. 
Nevertheless, the interested reader should examine Röpke's statements for him- or herself.
2 I could not find any academic citations of Jewkes except for antiquated book reviews. Positive 
reviews of Jewkes include those by Grampp (1949), Levitan (1949), Mackintosh (1949), and 
Worcester (1978). Mixed reviews include Brown (1948), Harris (1949), and Lipson (1949). 
Negative reviews include Fischer (1949), Brewin (1950), Aldcraft (1968), Sutherland (1968), and 
Lewis (1969). One important criticism made by several reviewers – both positive and negative – is 
that Jewkes failed to realize that his defense of the price-system and Say's Law was inconsistent 
with his simultaneous endorsement of Keynesian macroeconomic management.
3 When Mises said socialist calculation is “impossible,” he did not mean that one could not establish a 
persistently ongoing socialist political system. Rather, what he meant was that such a political 
system could never successfully accomplish the economic goals of its advocates (Hayek 1948: 146). 
Similarly, Mises did not say that socialism is logically impossible but that successful socialism is 
practically unfeasible (Steele 1992: 109). The political system may be established, but it will fail to 
accomplish what it is meant to.
4 This essay is an exercise in political theory, exploring the political-institutional reasons why 
democratic socialism or economic democracy must necessarily fail to accomplish the aims and 
intentions of its advocates. It is not an application of economic price theory, and it does not attempt 
to show whether socialism must fail for purely economic, non-political reasons. That argument has 
been made elsewhere, in the Austrian literature on the impossibility of economic calculation under 
socialism (Hayek 1935; Hayek 1948: 77-91, 119-208; Brutzkus 1935; Mises 1981 [1922]: 95-194; 
Hoff 1981 [1938]; Leoni 2009 [1965]; Lavoie 1985a; Lavoie 1985b; Steele 1992; de Soto 2010; 
Boettke 1998; Boettke 2012: 76-96, 226-240). For the sake of argument, this essay assumes that 
there is no problem of rational economic calculation under socialism. As far as is this essay is 
concerned, the Lange (1938)-Lerner-Taylor solution of market socialism might as well have 
successfully refuted Mises's, Hayek's, and Rothbard's claim that rational economic calculation is 
impossible under socialism. This essay takes no stand against Shleifer and Vishny's (1994: 166) 
claim that Lange (1938) did refute Hayek and Mises. What this essay will argue is that democratic 
socialism must fail, not necessarily because it is socialist, but because it is democratic. Even if 
socialism were economically feasible, it cannot be successfully institutionalized by democratic 
means and still accomplish its goals.
5 Cf. Lavoie's (1985a: 131) statement that while advocates of democratic socialism are right to 
criticize rent-seeking, their solution to this problem – viz. expanding the government's power over 
the economy – would make the problem worse. A better solution, Lavoie says, is to limit 
government's ability to bestow privilege on anybody and to reduce the number of benefits it has to 
offer anyone. Cf. Boettke (1995: 10), who finds a similar argument in Hayek.
6 For an interesting fictional illustration of how political incentives undermine market socialism, see 
Spufford (2010: 283-299, esp. 292). For a review of Spufford's novel, showing how much historical 
detail it reliably embodies despite its fictional nature, see Henderson (2012-2013).
7 That Austrian market process theory is compatible with Public Choice political process theory, see 
Boettke and López (2002) and Ikeda (2003). I thank an anonymous referee for pointing me to these 
papers.
8 Ludwig von Mises (1981 [1922]: 203f.) also noticed the connection between socialism's attack on 
competition and its unintentional rehabilitation of interest group politics: “In exposing the effects of 
protection, Liberalism broke the aggressive power of particular interests. . . . In order to rehabilitate 
protection, it was necessary to destroy Liberalism. . . . Once Liberalism has been completely 
vanquished, however, and no longer menaces the protective system, there remains nothing to oppose 
the extension of particular privileges.”
9 For an analysis of Hayek's thesis of the inseparability of political and economic freedom, see Makovi 
(2016b).
10 That regulation constitutes de facto nationalization, see Mises (1981 [1922]: 45). That such was 
done by the Nazi regime, see Mises (1974 [1950]: 24f., 1981 [1922]: 485).
11 Farrant and McPhail (2009: 12, 15) disagree with Caldwell. For a defense of Caldwell against Farant 
and McPhail, see Makovi (2016b). (I thank Vlad Tarko for directing me to Farrant and McPhail 
[2009]).
12 One may examine the measures of economic freedom compiled by the Fraser Institute under its 
Economic Freedom of the World index and come to the same conclusion. For any given year, 
Sweden has – compared to its contemporaries – tended to have low levels of regulation, low trade-
barriers, and high degrees of protection of private-property, tempered by high levels of taxation and 
redistribution. This is completely unlike the sort of regulatory command-and-control and 
nationalization to which Hayek's thesis in the Road to Serfdom applies.
13 See Makovi (2016b) for a more detailed defense of these points against Farrant and McPhail (2010).
14 I thank Vlad Tarko for directing me to Lawson and Clark (2010).
15 I thank Willem J. A. van der Deijl for forcing me to clarify this point.
16 This may buttress Buchanan's and Tullock's argument for qualified majority voting in Calculus of 
Consent (1962). If Hayek is right that government ought to act only where there is agreement, this 
might imply that all legislation should command the support of a super-majority. For reviews of 
Buchanan's and Tullock's argument, cf. Butler (2012: 95-100), Stevens (1993: 134-139), and Hinich 
and Munger (1997: 100-103).
17 The context of “Thresher” 174 is unrelated to our topic, but the quote seemed apt.
18 I would add Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Butler (2012: 36f.), and Stevens (1993: 214-229) 
